The problem of attacking and authenticating cyber-physical systems is considered. This paper concentrates on the case of a scalar, discrete-time, time-invariant, linear plant under an attack which can override the sensor and the controller signals. Prior works assumed the system was known to all parties and developed watermark-based methods. In contrast, in this paper the attacker needs to learn the openloop gain in order to carry out a successful attack. A class of two-phase attacks are considered: during an exploration phase, the attacker passively eavesdrops and learns the plant dynamics, followed by an exploitation phase, during which the attacker hijacks the input to the plant and replaces the input to the controller with a carefully crafted fictitious sensor reading with the aim of destabilizing the plant without being detected by the controller. For an authentication test that examines the variance over a time window, tools from information theory and statistics are utilized to derive bounds on the detection and deception probabilities with and without a watermark signal, when the attacker uses an arbitrary learning algorithm to estimate the open-loop gain of the plant.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent technological advances in wireless communications and computation, and their integration into networked control and cyber-physical systems (CPS) [1] , open the door to a myriad of new and exciting opportunities in transportation, health care, agriculture, energy, and many others.
However, the distributed nature of CPS is often a source of vulnerability [2] - [4] . Security breaches in CPS can have catastrophic consequences ranging from hampering the economy by obtaining financial gain, through hijacking autonomous vehicles and drones, and all the way to terrorism by manipulating life-critical infrastructures [5] - [8] . Real-world instances of security breaches in CPS that were discovered and made available to the public include the revenge sewage attack in Maroochy Shire, Australia [9] , the Ukraine power attack [10] , the German steel mill cyberattack [11] and the Iranian uranium enrichment facility attack via the Stuxnet malware [12] - [16] . Consequently, studying and preventing such security breaches via control-theoretic methods has received a great deal of attention in recent years [17] - [26] .
An important and widely used class of attacks on CPS are based on the "man-in-the-middle" (MITM) attack technique (cf. [27] ): an attacker takes over the physical plant's control and sensor signals. The attacker overrides the control signals with malicious inputs in order to push the plant toward an M. J. Khojasteh, M. Franceschetti, and T. Javidi are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA (e-mails: {mkhojast, mfranceschetti, tjavidi}@eng.ucsd.edu).
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alternative trajectory, often unstable and catastrophic. Consequently, the vast majority of CPS constantly monitor/sense the plant outputs with the objective of detecting a possible attack. The attacker, on the other hand, aims to overwrite the sensor readings in a manner that would be indistinguishable from the legitimate ones.
The simplest instance a MITM attack is the replay attack [28] - [30] , in which the attacker observes and records the legitimate system behavior across a long period of time and then replays it at the controller's input; this attack is reminiscent of the notorious attack of video surveillance systems, in which previously recorded surveillance footage is replayed during a heist. A well-known example of this attack is that of the Stuxnet malware, which used an operating system vulnerability to enable a twenty-one seconds long replay attack during which the attacker is believed to have driven the speed of the centrifuges at a uranium enrichment facility toward excessively high and destructive speed levels [31] . The extreme simplicity of the replay attack, which can be implemented with zero knowledge of the system dynamics and sensors specification, has made it a popular and wellstudied topic of research [28] - [30] , [32] - [34] .
In contrast to the replay attack, a paradigm that follows Shannon's maxim of Kerckhoffs's principle: "the enemy knows the system", was considered by Satchidanandan and Kumar [35] and Ko et al. [36] . This assumes that the attacker has complete knowledge of the dynamics and parameters of the system, which allows the attacker to construct arbitrarily long fictitious sensor readings, that are statistically identical to the actual signals, without being detected.
To counter both replay and "statistical-duplicate" attacks, Mo and Sinopoli [29] , and Satchidanandan and Kumar [35] , respectively, proposed to superimpose a random watermark on top of the (optimal) control signal that is not known to the attacker. In this way, by testing the correlation of the subsequent measurements with the watermark signal, the controller is able to detect the attack. Thus, by superimposing watermarking at different power levels, improved detection probability of the attack can be traded for an increase in the control cost. The two interesting models described above suffer from some shortcomings. First, in the case of a replay attack the usage of the watermarking signal is unnecessary: by taking a long enough detection window, the controller is always able to detect such an attack even in the absence of watermarks by simply testing for repetitions. A watermark is only necessary when the detection window of the controller is small compared to the recording (and replay) window of the attacker. Second, in the case of a statistical-duplicate attack, we must assume that the attacker has no access to the signal generated and applied by the controller. Since this type of attack assumes the attacker has full system knowledge, if it also has access to the control signal then it can contstruct a fictitious sensor readings containing any watermark signal inscribed by the controller. Assuming there is no access to the control signal seems a questionable assumption for an attacker who is capable of hijacking the whole system.
The two models constitute two extremes: the replay attack assumes no knowledge of the system parametersand as a consquence it is relatively easy to detect. The statistical-duplicate attack assumes full knowledge of the system dynamics (1) -and as a consequence it requires a more sophisticated detection procedure, as well as additional assumptions to ensure it can be detected.
In the current work, we explore a model that is in between these two extremes. We assume that the controller has perfect knowledge of the system dynamics, 1 while the attacker knows that the system is linear and time-invariant, but does not know the actual open-loop gain. It follows that the attacker needs to "learn" the plant first, before being capable of generating a fictitious control input. In this setting, we also consider the case when the attacker has full access to the control signals, and we investigate the robustness of different attacks to system parametric uncertainty. To determine whether an attack can be successful or not, we rely on physical limitations of the system's learning process, similar to an adaptive control setting [37] , rather than on cryptographic/watermarking techniques.
Our approach is reminiscent of parametric linear system identification (SysID), but in contrast to classical SysID our attacker is constrained to passive identification. Specifically, we consider two-phase attacks akin to the exploration and exploitation phases in reinforcement learning/multi-armed bandit problems [38] , [39] : in the exploration phase the attacker passively listens and learns the system parameter(s); in the exploitation phase the attacker uses the learned parameter(s) of the first phase to try and mimic the statistical behavior of the real plant, in a similar fashion to the statisticalduplicate attack. For the case of two-phase linear attacks, we analyze the achievable performance of a least-squares (LS) estimation-based scheme and a variance detection test, along with lower bound on the attack-detection probability under the variance detection test and any learning algorithm. We provide explicit results for the case where the duration of the exploitation phase tends to infinity. To enhance the security of the system, we also extend the results to the case of a superimposed watermark (or authentication) signal.
An outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. We set up the problem in Sec. II, and state the main results in Sec. III, with their proofs relegated to the appendix of the paper. Simulations are provided in Sec. IV. We conclude the paper and discuss the future research directions in Sec. V.
A. Notation
We denote by N the set of natural numbers. All logarithms, denoted by log, are base 2. For two real valued 1 A reasonable assumption as the controller is tuned in much longer and therefore can learn the system dynamics to a far greater percision. functions g and h, g(x) = O (h(x)) as x → x 0 means lim x→x0 |g(x)/h(x)| < ∞, and g(x) = o (h(x)) as x → x 0 means lim x→x0 |g(x)/h(x)| = 0. We denote by x j i = (x i , · · · , x j ) the realization of the random vector X j i = (X i , · · · , X j ) for i, j ∈ N, i ≤ j. · denotes the Euclidean norm. P X denotes the distribution of the random variable X with respect to (w.r.t.) probability measure P, whereas f X denotes its probability density function (PDF) w.r.t. to the Lebesgue measure, if it has one. An event happens almost surely (a.s.) if it occurs with probability one. For real numbers a and b, a b means a is much less than b, while for probability distributions P and Q, P Q means P is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Q. dP/dQ denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P w.r.t. Q. The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between probability distributions P X and P Y is defined as
where E P X denotes the expectation w.r.t. probability measure P X . The conditional KL divergence between probability distributions P Y |X and Q Y |X averaged over P X is defined
where (X,X) are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The mutual information between random variables X and Y is defined as I(X; Y ) D (P XY P X P Y ). The conditional mutual information between random variables X and Y given random variable Z is defined as I(X; Y |Z)
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider the networked control system depicted in Fig. 1 , where the plant dynamics are described by a scalar, discrete-time, linear time-invariant (LTI) system
where X k , a, U k , W k are real numbers representing the plant state, open-loop gain of the plant, control input, and plant disturbance, respectively, at time k ∈ N. The controller, at time k, observes Y k and generates a control signal U k as a function of Y k 1 . We assume that the initial condition X 0 has a known (to all parties) distribution and is independent of the disturbance sequence {W k }, which is an i.i.d. process with PDF a known to all parties. We assume that U 0 = W 0 = 0. With a slight loss of generality and for analytical purposes, we assume
Moreover, to simplify the notations, let Z k (X k , U k ) denote the state-and-control input at time k and its trajectory up to time k-by
. The controller is equipped with a detector that tests for anomalies in the observed history Y k 1 . When the controller detects an attack, it shuts the system down and prevents the (a) Exploration: During this phase, the attacker eavesdrops and learns the system, without altering the input signal to the controller (Y k = X k ).
(b) Exploitation: During this phase, the attacker hijacks the system and intervenes as an MITM in two places: acting as a fake plant for the controller (Y k = V k ) by impersonating the legitimate sensor and as a malicious controller (Ũ k ) for the plant. In what follows, it will be convenient to treat the openloop gain of the plant as a random variable A (i.e., it is fixed in time), whose PDF f A is known to the attacker, and whose realization a is known to the controller. We assume all random variables to exist on a common probability space with probability measure P, and denote the probability measure conditioned on A = a by P a . Namely, for any measurable event C, we define P a (C) = P(C|A = a).
A is further assumed to be independent of X 0 and {W k |k ∈ N}.
We consider the (time-averaged) linear quadratic (LQ) control cost [40] :
where the weights q and r are non-negative known (to the controller) real numbers that penalize the cost for state deviations and control actuations, respectively.
A. Adaptive Integrity Attack
We define Adaptive Integrity Attacks (AIA) that consist of a passive and an active phases, referred to as exploration and exploitation, respectively.
During the exploration phase, depicted in Fig. 1a , the attacker eavesdrops and learns the system, without altering the input signal to the controller, i.e., Y k = X k during this phase.
On the other hand, during the exploitation phase, depicted in Fig. 1b , the attacker intervenes as a MITM in two different parts of the control loop with the aim of pushing the plant toward an alternative trajectory (usually unstable) without being detected by the controller: it hijacks the true measurements and feeds the controller with a fictitious input Y k = V k instead. Furthermore, it issues and overrides a malicious control signal to the actuatorŨ k instead of the signal U k that is generated by the controller as depicted in Fig. 1b . Remark 1. Attacks that manipulate the control signal by tampering the integrity of the sensor readings, while trying to remain undetected, are usually referred to as integrity attacks, e.g., [41] . Since in the class of attacks described above, the attacker learns the open-loop gain of the plant in a fashion reminiscent of adaptive control techniques, we referred to attacks in this class as AIA.
•
B. Two-Phase AIA
While in a general AIA the attacker can switch between the exploration and exploitation phases back and forth or try to combine them together in an online fashion, in this work, we concentrate on a special class of AIA comprising only two disjoint consecutive phases as follows.
Phase 1: Exploration. As is illustrated in Fig. 1a for k ∈ [0, L], the attacker observes the plant state and control input, and tries to learn the open-loop gain a. We denote byÂ the attacker's estimate of the open-loop gain a.
• Phase 2: Exploitation. As is illustrated in Fig. 1b from time L + 1 and onwards, the attacker hijacks the system and feeds a malicious control signal to the plantŨ k , and-a fictitious sensor reading Y k = V k to the controller.
C. Linear Two-Phase AIA
A linear two-phase attack is a special case of the twophase AIA of Sec. II-B, in which the exploitation phase of the attacker takes the following linear form. 
Note that in case of an attack, during Phase 2 (k > L), (5) can be rewritten as
where (6b) follows from (4) . Hence, the estimation error (Â − a) dictates the ease at which an attack can be detected. While the controller in general can carry out different statistical tests to test the validity of (5) such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling tests [42, Ch. 14] , we consider a specific test in Sec. III-A that requires knowledge of only the second-order statistics.
D. Deception and Detection Probabilities
Define the hijack indicator at time k as the first time index at which hijacking occurs:
At every time k, the controller uses Y k 1 to construct an estimateΘ k of Θ k . We denote the following events.
• Θ k = 0,Θ k = 0: There was no attack, and no attack was declared by the detector. • Θ k = 1,Θ k = 1: An attacker hijacked the controller observation before time k but was caught by the controller/detector. In this case we say that the controller detected the attack. The detection probability at time k is defined as
Det P a Θ k = 1 Θ k = 1 .
• Θ k = 1,Θ k = 0: An attacker hijacked the observed signal by the controller before time k, and the controller/detector failed to detect the attack. In this case, we say that the attacker deceived the controller or, equivalently, that the controller misdetected the attack [42, Ch. 3 ]. The deception probability at time k is defined as
• Θ k = 0,Θ k = 1: The controller falsely declared an attack. We refer to this event as false alarm. The false alarm probability at time k is defined as
Clearly,
The controller wishes to achieve a low false alarm probability, while guaranteeing a low deception probability [42, Ch. 3] and a low control cost (3). In addition, in case of an attacker that knows (or has perfectly learned) the system gain a, and replaces {X k } of (1) with a virtual signal {V k } that is statistically identical and independent of it, the controller has no hope of correctly detecting the attack. We further define the deception, detection, and false alarm probabilities w.r.t. the probability measure P, without conditioning on A, and denote them by P k Dec , P k Det , and P k FA , respectively. For instance, P k Det is defined as
III. STATEMENT OF THE RESULTS
We now describe the main results of this work. We start by describing a variance-based attack-detection test in Sec. III-B.1. We derive upper and lower bound on the deception probability in Sec. III-B. The proofs of the results in this section are relegated to the appendix of the paper.
A. Attack-Detection Variance Test
A simple and widely used test is the one that seeks anomalies in the variance, i.e., a test that examines the empirical variance of (5) is equal to E W 2 . In this way, only second-order statistics of W need to be known at the controller. The price of this is of course is its inability to detect higher-order anomalies.
Specifically, this test sets a confidence interval of length 2δ > 0 around the expected variance, i.e., it checks whether
where T is called the test time. That is, as is implied by (6), the attacker manages to deceive the controller (
Eq. (5) suggests that the false alarm probability of the variance test (11) is
By applying Chebyshev's inequality (see [42, Prob. 11.27] ) and (2), we have
As a result, as T → ∞, the probability of false alarm goes to zero. Hence, in this limit, we are left with the task of determining the behavior of the deception probability (8) . We note that the asymptotic assumption T → ∞ simplifies the presentation of the results. Nonetheless, similar treatment can be done in the non-asymptotic case.
B. Bounds on the Deception Probability Under the Variance Test
In what follows, we assume that the power of the fictitious sensor reading signal V k ,
converges a.s. to a deterministic value 1/β as T tends to infinity for some positive real number β, namely, We now provide lower and upper bounds on the deception probability (8) of any linear two-phase AIA (4) whereÂ of (4) is constructed using any learning algorithm.
1) Lower Bound: To provide a lower bound on the deception probability P a,T Dec , we consider a specific estimate ofÂ at the conclusion of the first phase by the attacker, assuming a controller that uses the variance test (11) . To that end, we use least-squares (LS) estimation due to its efficiency and amenability to recursive update over observed incremental data, which makes it the method of choice for many applications of real-time parametric identification of dynamical systems [37] , [44] - [48] . The LS algorithm approximates the overdetermined system of equationŝ
to estimate (or "identify") the plant, the solution to which iŝ
Remark 3. Since we assumed W k for all time k has a PDF, the probability that X k = 0 is zero. Consequently, (14) is well-defined. •
Using LS estimation (14) achieves the following asymptotic deception probability. Theorem 1. Consider any linear two-phase AIA (4) with fictitious-sensor reading power that satisfies (13) and a control policy {U k }. Then, the asymptotic deception probability when using the variance test (11) is bounded from below as
Remark 4. Thm. 1 guarantees P a,T Dec = 1 for the choice U k = −aX k . An important consequence of this is that, for this choice, even without having any prior knowledge of the open-loop gain of the plant, the attacker can still carry a successful attack.
2) Upper Bound:
We derive an upper bound on the deception probability for the case of a uniformly distributed A over a symmetric interval [−R, R]. We assume the attacker knows the distribution of A (including the value of R), whereas the controller knows the true value of A (as before). Similar results can be obtained for other interval choices. We further note that this bound remains true for the scenario in which guarantees for the worst-case distribution need to be derived.
Theorem 2. Let A be distributed uniformly over [−R, R]
for some R > 0, and consider any control policy {U k } and any linear two-phase AIA (4) with fictitious-sensor reading power (13) that satisfies √ β ≤ R. Then, the asymptotic deception probability when using the variance test (11) is bounded from above as
for any sequence of probability measures Q X k |Z k−1
Remark 5. The bound in (15c) implies that the deception probability decreases with R. This is consistent with the observation of Zames [49] (see also [47] ) that SysID becomes harder as uncertainty about the open-loop gain of the plant increases; in our case, larger uncertainty interval R corresponds to worse estimation of the open-loop gain A by the attacker, which leads, in turn, to a decrease in the achievable deception probability by the attacker.
Thm. 2 provides two upper bounds on the deception probability. The first of them (15) clearly shows that increasing the privacy of the open-loop gain A-manifested in the mutual information between A and the state-and-control trajectory Z L 1 during the exploration phase-reduces the deception probability. The second bound (16) allows freedom in choos-ing the auxiliary probability measure Q X k |Z k−1 1 , making it a rather useful bound. An important instance is that of an i.i.d. Gaussian plant disturbance sequence W k ∼ N (0, σ 2 ); by choosing Q X k |Z k−1 1 ∼ N (0, σ 2 ), for this case, for all k ∈ N, we can rewrite the upper bound (16) in term of E Π (AX k−1 + U k−1 ) 2 as follows. N (0, σ 2 ) is an i.i.d. Gaussian plant disturbance sequence, the following upper bound on the asymptotic deception probability holds:
where
Remark 6. While the upper bound in (15c) is valid for all control policies, the upper bound in (16) , and consequently also the one in (17), is only valid for control policies where A → (X k , Z k−1 1 ) → U k form a Markov chain for all k ∈ {1, . . . , L}. To demonstrate this, choose U k = −AX k and evaluate the bounds in (15c) and (17) . Clearly (18) is finite. On the other hand I(A; Z L 1 ) and hence also the upper bound in (15c), is infinite, since, given X k and U k , A can be fully determined.
C. Watermarking
To increase the security of the system, at any time k, the controller can add an authentication (or watermarking) signal Γ k to a unauthenticated control policy {Ū k |k ∈ N}:
We refer to such a control policy U k as the authenticated control policyŪ k . We denote the states of the system that would be generated if only the unauthenticated control signal U k 1 were applied byX k 1 , and the resulting trajectory-bȳ Z k 1 (X k 1 ,Ū k 1 ). A "good" authentication signal entails little increase in the control cost (3) compared to its unauthenticated version while providing enhanced detection probability (8) and/or false alarm probability. Remark 7. In both the replay-attack [29] and the statisticalduplicate [35] models no access to the control signal U k by the attacker was allowed. Thus, to improve the detection probability of the controller in case of an attack, one could add an authentication/watermarking signal, which facilitated the controller with identify abnormalities by correlating the input watermarking signal with its contribution to the sensor reading. Yet, since in the statistical-duplicate setting full system knowledge at the attacker was assumed, if the attacker has the access to the control signal it could easily simulate the contribution of the any inscribed watermarking signal to the sequence of fictitious sensor readings. In contrast, in the replay-attack setting, no system knowledge is assumed rendering any knowledge of the control signal useless, unless learning the plant dynamics is invoked (and brings it to the realm of our work); the latter however takes away from the appeal of this technique which is owes it to its simplicity. Indeed, in our setup the attacker has full access to the control signal. However, in contrast to the statisticalduplicate setting, it cannot perfectly simulate the effect of the control signal as it lacks knowledge of the open-loop gain. Thus, the watermarking signal here is used for a different purpose-to impede the learning process of the attacker. • At first glance, one may envisage that superimposing any watermarking signal Γ k on top of the control policy {Ū k |k ∈ N} would necessarily enhance the detectability of an attack since the effective observations of the attacker are in this case noisier. However, it turns out that injecting a strong noise may in fact speed up the learning process as it improves the the power of the signal maginifed by the open-loop gains with respect to the observed noise [50] .
The following corollary proposes a class of watermarking signals that provide better guarantees on the deception probability P T Dec . Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Corollary 1, for any control policy {Ū k |k ∈ N} with trajectoryZ k 1 = (X k 1 ,Ū k 1 ) and its corresponding authenticated control policy U k 1 (19) with trajectory Z k 1 = (X k 1 , U k 1 ), the following majorization holds:
where G is defined in (18) , and Ψ k−1
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, we compare the empirical performance of the variance-test algorithm with the developed bounds in this work as well as the replay attack.
At every time T , the controller tests the empirical variance for abnormalities over a detection window of size T ≤ T , [T − T + 1, T ], with a confidence interval 2δ > 0 around the expected variance (11) . When T = T the statistical test used in the simulation, the hijack indicator Θ T , and its estimatê Θ T at the controller become equivalent to the definitions of the variance test in (11) , the hijack indicator in (7) , and the estimate of the latter of Sec. II-D, respectively.
We use the following parameters for the simulation: δ = 0.1, and T = 800, the open-loop gain of the plant (1) is a = 1.2, the entries of the plant disturbance sequence {W k } are i.i.d. standard Gaussian. The applied control policy is U k = −0.85aX k . The length of exploration phase, for both the replay attack and the AIA, is L = 80. We use the LS algorithm (14) of Sec. III-B.1 to constructÂ. Fig. 2 demonstrates the weakness of the replay attack once the controller uses a sufficiently large detection window, even in the absence of watermarking.
In contrast, when no attack is cast on the system, the alarm rate becomes the false alarm rate and is also depicted in Fig. 2 . Clearly, the false alarm probability is high for A semi-logarithmic scale for the detection window size T is used. The control input is chosen to be U k = −0.85aY k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ 800, a = 1.2, and {W k } is an i.i.d. standard Gaussian sequence. The three curves correspond to three different scenarios: no attack is carried-in this case, the alarm rate becomes the false alarm rate; replay attack with a recording length of L = 80; AIA with an exploration phase of length L = 80.
small detection windows and decays to zero as the detection window become large, with agreement with (12) .
In our second simulation, depicted in Fig. 3 , we evaluate the detection rate as a function of the power of a watermarking signal. To that end, we fix the detection window to be T = 800, which guarantees a negligible false alarm probability, and use Gaussian i.i.d. zero-mean watermarks {Γ k } as in (19) with different power.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We studied attacks on cyber-physical systems which consist of exploration and exploitation phases, where the attacker first explores the dynamic of the plant, after which it hijacks the system by playing a fictitious sensor reading to the controller/detector while and feedind a detrimental control input to the plant. Future research will address the setting of authentication systems in which both the attacker and the controller do not know the dynamic of the plant. To that end, one needs to generate watermarking signals that simultaneously facilitate the learning of the controller and hinder the learning of the attacker. 
Gaussian sequences whose power is shown on the x-axis. {W k } is an i.i.d. standard Gaussian sequence. The attack is assumed to be AIA with an exploration phase of length L = 80, and the detection window size equals T = T = 800. The following lemma establishes an upper bound on the squared estimation error (Â − a) 2 in terms of the state and distrubance sequences of plant, whenÂ is constructed using LS estimation (14) . Lemma 3. If the attacker constructsÂ using LS estimation (14) , then
Proof. This proof essentially follows from [47, Lemma 1] for our scalar plant (1) . As mentioned before, since W k for all time k has a PDF the probability that X k = 0 is zero. This allows us, in turn, to define the random variables S k = U k /X k almost surely for all k. Thus, we have
By further applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we deduce
Finally, by noting that (a−S k )X k = aX k −U k = X k+1 −W k and substituting it in (23) concludes the proof.
The proof of Thm. 1 now follows by combining the results of Lemmata 2 and 3, and noting that X k+1 − W k = aX k + U k .
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We start by proving (15) . Since the attacker observed the plant state and control input during the exploration phase which lasts L time steps, and since A → (X L 1 , U L 1 ) →Â constitutes a Markov chain, using the continuous domain version of Fano's inequality [52, Prop. 2] , we have
whenever √ δβ ≤ R. Using (9) and Lem. 2 we deduce
Consequently, using (10) and the dominated convergence theorem [51] it follows that which proves (15) by recalling (9) . To prove (16), we further bound I(A; Z L 1 ) from above via KL divergence manipulations; similar arguments have been previously used, e.g., in [53] . The proof of the following lemma follows the arguments of [47] , and is detailed here for completeness. 
We next bound I A; Z k Z k−1 1 from above.
where we substitute the definition of Z k (X k , U k ) to arrive at (26a), (26b) follows from the chain rule for mutual informations and the Markovity assumption A → (X k , Z k−1 1 ) → U k , we use the definition of the conditional mutual information in terms of the conditional KL divergence (recall Sec. I-A) to attain (26c) and (26d), the manipulation in (26e)is valid due to the condition Π X k |Z k−1 1 Q X k |Z k−1 1 in the setup of the lemma, and (26f) follows from the nonnegativity property of the KL divergence.
Substituting (26) in (25) concludes the proof.
Applying the bound of Lem. 4 to the first bound of the theorem (15) proves the second bound of the theorem.
C. Proof of Corollary 1
Set Q X k |Z k−1 1 ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). Then, Π X k |Z k−1 1 ,A = N (AX k−1 + U k−1 , σ 2 ), and hence the measure domination condition Π X k |Z k−1 1 Q X k |Z k−1 1 holds.
= E Π D N (AX k−1 + U k−1 , σ 2 ) N (0, σ 2 ) = log e 2σ 2 E Π (AX k−1 + U k−1 ) 2 . The result follows by combining (16) and (27) .
D. Proof of Corollary 2.
Using (1) and (19), we can rewriteX k and X k explicitly as follows
Thus, the following relation holds:
By comparing
in which we have utilized (28) , and provided (20) , we arrive at G(Z T 1 ) > G(Z T 1 ).
